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“Europe is, without a doubt, in its most serious 
crisis since the fall of the Berlin Wall,” said 
German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. 
The European Union needs to respond to the 
military threat of its ‘strategic partner’ Russia in 
Eastern and Southern Ukraine and the annexation 
of Crimea. After the toppling of president Viktor 
Yanukovych, Moscow seems to be terrified 
beyond Western expectations to lose the historical 
components of its former empire, with Ukraine 
as most important puzzle piece. A ‘spiral of 
escalation’ unleashed: The Kremlin amplified 
existing reservations of Russian speakers in 
Ukraine against Kyiv and presents itself as their 
protector. The European Union seems stunned 
to find itself at the culmination point of two 
integration projects colliding: The European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), established to 
create a stable external environment by socializing 
third countries pitted against the re-integration 
of the post-Soviet space under the umbrella of 
Moscow, omitting the “greatest catastrophe of the 
20th century” in the words of Russian president 
Vladimir Putin – the dissolution of the USSR. At 
this critical juncture, Brussels and its 28 member 
states need to move beyond their agreed sanction 
policy to stop the territorial hunger of Moscow 
and initiate multi-lateral negotiations, while at 
the same time displaying a deeper understanding 
of Russian sensitivities. Such two-track strategy 
is difficult to balance, but will prove inevitable to 
keep peace in the Eastern neighbourhood.
The largest obstacle to a constructive dialogue 
between Brussels and Moscow is their two 
different patterns of thought. Post-Soviet Russia 
still believes in the imperative of security politics, 
interpreted in the simple 19th century logic of 
zero-sum games; a thinking dominated by notions 
of zones of influence and strategic advantages. 
This realist mindset is fueled by nostalgia for the 
lost empire, perceived international injustices after 
1991, and a vague feeling of impotence. As many 
Germans after 1945, a majority of Russians did 
not get over the loss of integral parts of their ‘old 
glory’ yet. Now Russians even face the potential 
breakaway of the cradle of their culture in Kyiv. 
It took Germany 25 years after its aggression and 
the horrors of World War II to accept its borders 
as final in the so-called ‘Ostverträge’. As a child 
of these horrors – established against national 
adventures and close-mindedness – the ‘civilian 
power’ EU believes in interdependence. Guided 
by this liberal spirit of economics, European 
politicians cannot grasp, why president Putin 
consciously endangers the integration of Russia 
into the global markets and scares away foreign 
investments. This clash of reason let German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel to claim that Putin 
lives “in another world”.1 Does he? Geopolitical 
considerations actually never disappeared in EU 
external relations – the ENP itself is a geostrategic 
project.
Putin actually won, what was achievable at a 
justifiable price. Moscow regained control of the 
Black Sea fleet and potential instruments to block 
any Ukrainian government to address serious 
economic and political reforms. Influencing Kyiv 
is important, since without Ukraine his dream of 
a Eurasian Economic Union remains premature. 
The existing customs union with Belarus and 
Kazakhstan is intended to turn by 2015 into a 
unified post-Soviet space: a free trade zone with 
common external tariff and free movement of 
capital, goods, people and services. Putin has to 
be careful though not to discourage the leaders in 
Minsk and Astana or prospective member states 
as Armenia and Kyrgyzstan with his aggressive 
politics. Besides, by bolstering a defiant national 
pride Putin achieves legitimacy and maintains his 
firm power grip which is becoming increasingly 
1 Peter Baker, Pressure Rising as Obama Works to Rein In Russia, 
NY Times, March 2, 2014. 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/03/world/europe/pressure-
rising-as-obama-works-to-rein-in-russia.html?_r=0
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threatened after the December 2011 protests and 
his re-election in spring 2012. The Union needs 
to be aware of the internal exchange value of his 
economically costly foreign policy build upon 
relational identity building: ‘us’ against ‘them’. 
Putin does not fear a political confrontation with 
the EU since Moscow believes it to be too divided 
and having too little interest in Ukraine. Therefore, 
the Kremlin expects only minor political sanctions 
from Brussels, and firmly believes that in not-too-
distant future the member states will pragmatically 
resume economic co-operation.
The Ukrainian crisis is the culmination of 
a foreseeable development in the two decades 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. All 
legitimate dismay about the boldness of Putin’s 
move aside; Brussels is reaping the fruits of a 
lacking Russian strategy. Until now the Union 
failed to tackle the realities of a post-imperial 
landscape in its Eastern neighbourhood. EU 
papers after 2002 recognized that “Russia and 
the enlarged European Union form part of each 
other’s neighbourhood,”2 thus acknowledging 
the equivalence of both – and more importantly 
the danger of a potential geopolitical rivalry. This 
area with its patchwork of various minorities 
was torn apart by the invention of the nation 
state. The dissolution of the Soviet empire left 
islands of Russian speaking minorities scattered 
in that landscape. These conflicts between 
newly independent – usually Western backed 
– host nations and Russian minorities evolved 
into conflicts in the Baltic states in the 1990s, a 
civil war in Moldova 1992, and an international 
war with Georgia in August 2008. The ‘frozen 
conflicts’ of Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
resemble festering wounds, always capable of 
infecting the political stability of the continent.
Latest by 2007, storms were ahead in EU-
Russia relations: the partnership and cooperation 
agreement was not prolonged and the anti-ballistic 
missile system was introduced against strong 
resistance of the Kremlin. In June 2008 Russian 
president Dmitry Medvedev called for a new 
European security architecture, which the EU 
2 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy. 
Strategy Paper, COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12.05.2004, p. 4.
states were not willing to concede. Two months 
later the war in Georgia heralded the farewell of 
Russia from any substantial cooperation with the 
Union, despite negotiations on a modernization 
partnership. The Ukrainian crisis is the breaking 
point of the unresolved antagonism between ‘the 
West’ and Russia.
Recommendations
As “the EU’s credibility as a global player will 
depend to a great extent on its capacity to act 
decisively in its neighbourhood”3 the Union has to 
prove it can rise up to the challenge. The Union’s 
record so far is not as bleak as some analysts claim: 
the February 21 agreement leading to the ouster 
of president Yanukovych and his corrupt regime 
indicated the strength of the ‘Weimar triangle’ 
constellation, representing France, Germany 
and Poland as backbone of Europe. The crisis 
management revealed an unexpected unity, when 
the EU member states on their March 6 emergency 
summit demanded de-escalation from Russia by 
announcing sanctions, which as first step lead to 
a halt of the partnership agreement and visa-free 
talks with Russia; since March 17 including as 
second step, visa bans and asset freezes against 
21 individuals. If Moscow continues to destabilize 
Eastern and Southern Ukraine various economic 
restrictions are intended to follow. The rift between 
conciliatory Western Europeans (Germany and 
France) and resolute Central Europeans (Poland 
and Baltic Republics) is far less pronounced as in 
case of August 2008, when the EU failed to either 
send a strong signal of disaffirmation or finding a 
sustainable agreement with Moscow. Nevertheless 
the ‘non-strategy’ of 2008 revealed the power of 
the ‘the West’, since no post-Soviet state ever 
recognized Abkhazia or South Ossetia.
Now, Crimea is de facto lost. But to avoid 
any further aggression and react on the massive 
violation of any code of conduct by Putin, the 
European Union has to show clearly that there 
are norms and principles more important than 
profits and energy considerations; in line with 
above mentioned two-track strategy of balancing 
3 European Commission, Delivering on a New Neighbourhood 
Policy, JOIN(2012) 14 final, Brussels, 15.05.2012, p. 21.
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containment and anticipating Russian prevailing 
security perceptions. First, strong signals of 
support for the Ukrainian interim government; 
second, the EU needs to adopt strong sanctions 
against Russia to pressure for an international 
contact group and guarantee the territorial 
integrity of Ukraine; thirdly, entering a honest 
discussion about the future of those states caught 
in between the EU and Russia.
In the EU’s support for Ukraine the first tranche 
of the 11 billion Euro package as discussed now 
should be paid quickly. Without neglecting the 
importance of normative programming, the 
‘hard conditions’ of revaluating the Ukrainian 
currency and stopping to subsidize the gas prices 
for private households should be reconsidered in 
favor of longer term anti-corruption measures. 
The Ukrainian exports can be assisted by 
forestalling parts of the intended association 
agreement, foremost by eliminating all import 
taxes on agricultural and industrial products. The 
signing of the agreement, including a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area, should be left to 
the new government elected on May 25, hopefully 
representing all sections of Ukrainian society. As 
stated in the Council conclusion, “the Agreement 
does not constitute the final goal in EU-Ukraine 
cooperation.”4 To realize the normative intentions 
of the ENP, the Union needs to be aware that 
reforms “demand the involvement of wider 
society, longer-term engagement, and high 
implementation costs”5.
The current sanction regime against Moscow 
needs to be expanded. Sanctions should aim 
at immediate negotiations between Kyiv and 
Moscow within an international contact group, a 
ceasefire of all forces on Crimea and deter Russia 
from any further military involvement in other 
parts of Ukraine. And as painful as they might be 
for the EU, the symbolic value of strong sanctions 
matters more than their actual impact. Brussels 
4 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Ukraine, 
Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 03.03.2014.
5 Stefan Meister, After Vilnius: Why the EU needs to rethink its 
Eastern Partnership, European Council on Foreign Relations 
(ECFR), Berlin, 20.12.2013. 
 http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_after_vilnius_why_the_
eu_needs_to_rethink_234
should adopt a more generalized travel ban, 
which would severely hit the Russian elites with 
their apartments in London and vacations along 
the Mediterranean – intended to further weaken 
the bond between Putin and the Russian ‘middle 
class’, which suffers most from the current 
paralysis of Russia’s economic development. 
Furthermore an import ban of Russian oil and 
gas should be sincerely considered. Calculations 
of energy experts show that Moscow would lose 
around 100 million Dollar per day and the EU 
could survive at least 150 days, since the stocks 
of gas and oil after the mild winter are high, and a 
number of states (among them Germany) already 
diversified their energy imports to a degree that 
those states which rely heavily on Russian exports 
could be supported. And last but not least liquid 
gas from Qatar, and eventually the US, could 
compensate for potential shortages.6
On the second track, while pressing for an 
international contact group, European politicians 
should avoid a language of confrontation and 
fait accompli politics, highlight the right of self-
determination of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
states and defuse prevalent fears of encirclement 
in Russia. To lure the Russians to the negotiation 
table, the following issues should be openly 
addressed: 1) Crimea: the existence of a Russian 
speaking majority with their genuine will to join 
the Russian Federation should be acknowledged 
by setting up a new referendum under international 
supervision. The marine base Sevastopol should 
be in any case subject to a lease agreement 
between Kyiv and Moscow; 2) Federalization 
of the Ukrainian political system: The tensions 
between a Ukrainian national Western part and 
an Eastern part culturally linked to the former 
USSR is not a propaganda lie of Moscow. Without 
honest reconciliation, the Ukrainian question will 
not be solvable. This requires openness from the 
new government after May 25 towards granting 
extensive autonomy to the Southern and Eastern 
parts of the country, under the presence of an 
OSCE mission.
6 Cp. Richard Friebe, Das Gas geht uns so schnell nicht aus, 
Frankfurter Sonntagszeitung, Nr. 10, 09.03.2014, S. 61.
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To open direct negotiations between the EU, 
Ukraine and Russia with the help of this stick-
and-carrot approach is of paramount importance. 
Within negotiations all involved actors are likely 
to sober up and reach a compromise which serves 
their interests best. After a settlement of the 
Ukrainian crisis this trialogue should continue 
and be joined by the other EaP countries to initiate 
a new conference on security and cooperation 
in Europe. In this forum the ambiguous future 
of those states, where “Wider Europe” and the 
Russian “Near Abroad” overlap – thus Belarus, 
Moldova, Ukraine and the three states of the 
Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia) – needs to be resolved. As a result 
Moscow would be integrated in a holistic strategy 
for the Eastern neighbourhood. The 2007 German 
idea of an ‘ENP Plus’ could serve as starting 
ground for resilient new institutions. As Germany 
in the treaties of 1970 finally accepted the loss of 
its former Eastern territories, Moscow’s worries 
need to be embedded in a binding agreement; to 
guarantee the free choice of the societies of the 
EaP as well as security concerns of Russia. Until 
then, Russia remains Europe’s main security 
problem.
